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Consider the opposite

type: technique · origin: study · evidence: supported · themes: judgements and probabilities

Claim assessed: Asking what you would believe if things were the other way round reduces judgement errors.

Published · how we work

In short

Considering the opposite means asking yourself, before a conclusion, what you would think if the evidence pointed the other way, or why you might be wrong. Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984) proposed the technique against the tendency to judge evidence in favour of one’s own view. It worked better than a simple call to be objective. Later studies found effects on anchoring and other judgements too, but a 2023 study gave mixed results.

What it says

The idea. Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984) start from an observation they attribute to Francis Bacon: many judgement errors come from failing to consider the possibilities that contradict what we believe at the moment. If someone is prompted to consider the opposite, they should judge less one-sidedly.

The first experiments. Lord et al. (1984) tested the idea in two areas: how people judge evidence on social issues, and how they test their impressions of someone’s personality. In one of the experiments they repeated the classic death penalty study, in which supporters and opponents found the study that confirmed their view more convincing. Participants in one group were asked to think about how they would have rated each study’s method if its results had been exactly the opposite. Others were only asked to be as objective and impartial as possible. The call to be objective didn’t help. Considering the opposite reduced both the biased judgement and the polarisation of views.

On anchoring. Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer (2000) asked car experts to estimate the value of a ten-year-old car, after the experimenter gave his own estimate, either low or high. The anchor influenced their estimates. But those asked to find arguments for why the anchor was inappropriate were influenced less. This matters because, as Mussweiler, Englich and Strack (2004) note, explicit warnings about anchoring, even including the direction of the distortion, do not reduce the effect.

Not just the opposite. Hirt and Markman (1995) showed that it need not be the opposite: any plausible alternative makes you consider more possibilities and reduces the error. The alternative does, however, need to seem plausible.

How much the initial view mattered when rating two made-up studies about the pandemic, measured as a proportion of variance explained. In the first study: 0.52 in the control group and 0.43 for those who looked for reasons the study might be wrong. In the second study: 0.36 in the control group and 0.04 for those who considered how they would rate the study if it had shown the opposite. How much the initial view mattered in rating the studies (η², from 0 to 1) Study 1: vaccination no instructions 0.52 “give three reasons the study could be wrong” 0.43 Study 2: restrictions no instructions 0.36 “how would you rate it if it had shown the opposite?” 0.04 262 and 250 participants, in 2022
Data from Greitemeyer (2023), statistics reported in the text. The lower the value, the less the rating depended on the initial view.

A recent test. Greitemeyer (2023) tested two versions of the technique on pandemic topics in 2022. Participants read summaries of two made-up studies, one for and one against their view, and rated them.

The author notes that the two studies also differed in topic: beliefs about the vaccine were stronger. The techniques might work less well when beliefs are strong.

Example

You read an article that confirms exactly what you believed about a diet, and it seems very well done. You ask yourself: if the same study, with the same method, had found the opposite, would I have thought it just as good? If the answer is no, you look more closely at the method. The example is an illustration, not a study cited here.

How to apply it

The steps below are a practical way of applying it that we propose, based on the cited studies.

  1. Don’t rely on the intention to be objective. In Lord et al.’s study, the call to be impartial didn’t help.
  2. Flip the result. When you judge a piece of evidence, ask yourself how you would judge it if it had shown the opposite. This was the version that worked in both studies that tested it on evidence.
  3. When you start from a number, look for reasons it is wrong. In anchoring, arguments against the anchor reduced the effect.
  4. The alternative must be plausible. It needn’t be exactly the opposite, but it must seem possible to you.
  5. Expect a partial effect. Even at best, the bias dropped; it did not disappear.

Limits and nuances

Sources

See also: Anchoring, Cognitive dissonance, Confirmation bias